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Key management is a core mechanism to provide secure and reliable communications in wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
In large-scale WSNs, due to the resource constraint on sensor nodes, it is still an extremely challenging task to achieve good
performance in terms of high network connectivity and strong resilience against sensor nodes capture with low overheads.
To address this issue, in this paper we propose a novel random pairwise key establishment scheme, called RPKE. In RPKE,
sensor nodes diﬀerentiate their roles as either auxiliary nodes or ordinary nodes prior to network deployment. The auxiliary
nodes act as distributed key distribution center (KDC), and neighboring ordinary nodes can establish pairwise key with the
help of the distributed KDC. Theoretical analysis and simulation evaluation demonstrate that RPKE performs well in terms of
network connectivity and resilience at the cost of low computation/communication/storage overheads, compared to the existing
counterparts.
1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) provide many promising
applications such as, pollution sensing, environment, and
traﬃc monitoring [1]. Security is a critical issue especially
when WSN is deployed in hostile environment where sensor
nodes may be exposed to a variety of malicious attacks.
One of the fundamental problems in WSN is how to
bootstrap secure communications, that is, how to establish
pairwise keys between sensor nodes in order to oﬀer data
confidentiality and data integrity.
Large-scale WSNs consist of a large number of sensor
nodes [2, 3]. Usually, sensor nodes have limited capacity
in terms of computation power, communication range, and
storage space. For example, the MICA2 mote has an 8-
bit 7.3828-MHz Atmega 128 L processor with only 4-Kbyte
SRAM and 128-Kbyte ROM [4]. Hence, classical asymmetric
cryptography such as, RSA [5] or centralized key agreement
scheme [6] is unsuitable for WSN due to limited resources.
Recently, symmetric key predistribution schemes [7–9]
have been proposed to achieve secure communications in
WSNs. In key predistribution schemes, sensor nodes preload
some keys or keying material prior to network deployment
and establish pairwise keys by exchanging partial keying
information after network deployment. A trivial solution is
to distribute a shared master key to all sensor nodes, so
each pair of nodes can establish secure communication link
with less storage. However, this trivial scheme oﬀers the
worst resilience because the adversary can compromise all
the communication links even though he only compromises
a single sensor node. Another naı¨ve solution is to distribute
unique pairwise keys for all pair of sensor nodes; the
adversary cannot compromise the communication links
between two noncompromised sensor nodes no matter how
many nodes have been compromised. However, each node
must store N-1 keys where N is the network size, so this
naı¨ve solution is not scalable for large-scale WSNs due to
the storage constraint in sensor nodes. Single key distributed
center-(KDC-) based key predistribution scheme [10] can
eﬃciently reduce the storage cost for sensor nodes, but it
incurs large communication cost for sensor nodes and suﬀers
from a single point of failure.
Random key predistribution schemes [7, 11–19] have
recently attracted much attention, in which sensor nodes
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randomly pick a part of keys out of a large key pool prior to
network deployment. After network deployment, neighbor-
ing nodes share common keys with a certain probability and
can establish pairwise keys using these common keys. Hence,
the random key predistribution schemes are considered as
the most practical ones in WSNs due to their distributed
nature and simplicity.
However, due to the random predistribution, the pre-
loaded the number of keys in each node will increase linearly
with the total number of nodes if the desirable network
connectivity probability is required, which will incur a high
storage burden in large-scale WSNs. For security, the nodes
are expected to be preloaded with a small number of keys.
The smaller number of preloaded keys, the less number
of keys will be acquired by the adversary when a node is
compromised. To achieve high performance, some eﬃcient
schemes have been presented to establish pairwise key, by
employing multiple polynomials [13], location information
[14, 15], deployment knowledge [16], multiple key spaces
[17], or heterogeneity [18]. However, such schemes either
incur high computation burden [13, 17] or make assump-
tions that may not be always available in typical WSNs [14–
17]. Therefore, it is still an extremely challenging task to
achieve high network connectivity, strong resilience against
node capture, and low storage/computation/communication
overheads.
Motivated by this, in this paper we propose a novel
Random Pairwise Keys Establishment (RPKE) scheme for
WSNs, in which nodes diﬀerentiate their roles as auxiliary or
ordinary nodes prior to network deployment. After network
deployment, auxiliary nodes serve as distributed KDCs to
help pairwise key establishment between ordinary nodes.
Two key pools, namely, initial key pool and root key pool,
are constructed for auxiliary nodes, and ordinary nodes
respectively. With the help of auxiliary nodes which preload
a large number of initial keys, ordinary nodes only preload a
small fraction of root keys and can establish pairwise key with
high probability while keeping stronger resilience against
node compromise.
The main advantages of RPKE include the following.
(1) Eﬃciency: the RPKE scheme is very suitable for large-
scale WSNs, where the distributed KDCs can eﬃciently
distribute the keying material to neighboring ordinary
nodes during pairwise key establishment, thus the stor-
age/communication/computation overheads for the ordi-
nary nodes are significantly reduced. (2) Robustness: the
RPKE scheme is very robust against node compromise. By
constructing two types of key pool for two kinds of sensor
nodes, respectively, the secret keys (initial keys and root keys)
are stored separately in auxiliary nodes and ordinary nodes.
Thus, it is diﬃcult for the adversary to acquire the pairwise
key between noncompromised ordinary nodes by capturing
arbitrarily a part of sensor nodes. (3) Flexibility: according to
the diﬀerent application scenarios, the security parameters
in RPKE can be conveniently tuned to achieve excellent
network connectivity and high security strength with very
low overhead requirement in ordinary nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review the related works. The background and some
preliminaries related to the proposed scheme are given
in Section 3. In Section 4, the proposed RPKE scheme is
introduced in detail. The network performance and security
analysis are, respectively, presented in Sections 5 and 6,
followed by conclusions in Section 7.
2. Related Works
In literatures, various key predistribution schemes have been
proposed for securing WSNs.
SNEP [10] is a single KDC-based key predistribution
scheme, where each node only preloads a symmetric key
shared between itself and the base station, which acts as a
single KDC. If two sensor nodes want to establish pairwise
key, they must communicate with the base station, and
then the base station assigns the pairwise key for them.
Clearly, in the large-scale WSNs, SNEP will incur high
communication burden for those sensor nodes near to the
base station. Furthermore, the single point of failure will
break the security of the entire network.
Eschenauer and Gilgor [7] firstly propose random key
predistribution scheme, which is referred as basic scheme in
this paper. In basic scheme, prior to network deployment,
each sensor node preloads a key ring with a randomly chosen
subset of keys from a large key pool without replacement,
and two neighboring nodes have some probability p of suc-
cessfully completing key establishment. Due to the random
key predistribution, it is probable that a shared key may
not be available, necessitating the intermediary nodes with
common keys between the two sensor nodes to establish
pairwise key for them. The q-composite key predistribution
scheme [11] is a modified version of the basic scheme,
diﬀering only in the fact that multiple keys are used to
establish pairwise key instead of just one. By increasing the
amount of key overlap required for key establishment, this
scheme increases the resilience against node compromise.
However, the basic scheme and the q-composite scheme
cannot achieve good performance in the large-scale WSNs.
The number of compromised communication links between
noncompromised neighboring sensor nodes will dramat-
ically increase with the number of compromised sensor
nodes. Recently, Blackshear and Verma [12] propose a
randomizing LEAP+ key distribution scheme to resist the
node compromise attack which is vulnerable in basic scheme.
To enhance the security, Liu and Ning [13] propose
a multiple polynomial-based random key predistribution
scheme in which each node randomly preloads a subset
of polynomial shares, two neighboring nodes can establish
pairwise key if they have the polynomial share on the
same bivariate polynomial. Due to the λ-secure property of
polynomial (i.e., the polynomial remains secure if no more
than λ polynomial shares are compromised), the scheme
has good resilience; however, the required O(λ) modular
multiplications incur large computation overhead. Similarly,
in the multiple key space-based scheme [14] with λ-secure
property, the computation burden makes it not scalable for
large-scale WSNs.
To reduce the storage requirement in nodes, based on
expected locations of the nodes, Liu and Ning [15] present
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a location-aware random key predistribution scheme. Any
two nodes would share a common pairwise key if both of
them expect to appear in each other’s signal range with a
high probability. Huang et al. [16] propose a grid-group
deployment scheme to improve resilience against selective
node capture and node fabrication attack. Du et al. [17]
further propose a random key predistribution scheme by
exploiting the node deployment knowledge such that the
probability to find a common secret key between any two
neighboring nodes can be maximized while other perfor-
mance metrics are not degraded. Although such schemes
achieve good performance in terms of connectivity and
resilience, the pre-determined location information or the
deployment knowledge, however, are not always available in
typical WSNs.
Traynor et al. [18] proposed an unbalanced random
key predistribution scheme for Heterogeneous WSNs, where
there are a large number of the less capable nodes (L1) and
a small number of the more capable nodes (L2). Fewer keys
are preloaded in L1 nodes while more keys are preloaded in
L2 nodes, and L1 nodes and L2 nodes can achieve secure
connection in diﬀerent scenarios. In this scheme, L2 nodes
are the bottleneck of network connectivity and resilience.
Vu et al. [19] figure out that most random key predis-
tribution schemes are vulnerable to the node capture attack,
and then propose virtual key ring technique to strengthen the
resilience by reducing the preloaded keying material while
maintaining secure connectivity of the network.
iPAK [20], LKE [21], and SBK [22] are the In-Situ key
establishment schemes. In these schemes, nodes diﬀerentiate
their roles as service sensors and worker sensors. Service
sensors are used to disseminate keying information to the
work sensors in the vicinity after network deployment.
One benefit of these schemes is that all the work sensors
need not preload any keying information and can directly
establish pairwise key with neighboring worker sensors,
which can save storage space greatly; however, the major
drawback of these schemes is that it must use Rabin’s
cryptosystem to establish secure channel between the work
sensors and service sensors. Thus, such schemes may incur
higher communication/computation cost and have worse
topology adaptability.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. System Model. We consider a WSN consisting of two
types of sensor nodes, ordinary nodes and auxiliary nodes.
Ordinary nodes are in charge of normal network operation,
whereas auxiliary nodes are to oﬀer keying material to help
the pairwise key establishment for ordinary nodes and do not
participate in other further network operation.
The number of auxiliary nodes is much smaller than
that of the ordinary nodes. Moreover, due to the nature
of random deployment, there is not any deployment or
neighbor information available for all the sensor nodes prior
to network deployment.
In our consideration, all the sensor nodes are not
assumed to be equipped with tamper-resistant hardware due
to resource constraints and can directly communicate only
S14
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S34 = H(S3‖S4)
S1 = H(O1)
Figure 1: Merkle hash tree with four objects: O1, O2, O3, and O4.
with a limited number of other sensor nodes located in the
communication range.
3.2. Threat Model. We assume that the adversary has more
powerful resources in terms of energy, computation, and
communication capacity than sensor nodes. The adversary
can compromise a fraction of sensor nodes chosen arbitrarily
in WSN. Moreover, the adversary can expose all the secret
information within the compromised sensor nodes. How-
ever, all the sensor nodes must be designed to survive at least
a short interval when captured by an adversary.
In this work, the goal of the adversary is the exposure
of the pairwise key between two noncompromised ordinary
nodes. If a pairwise key is acquired by the adversary, the
data confidentiality in the link will no longer be secure.
To achieve the goal, the adversary can either overhear
the transmitted message through the radio communication
channel or physically capture any sensor nodes.
3.3. Merkle Hash Tree. Merkle hash tree [23] is a complete
binary tree which is usually used to oﬀer identity authentica-
tion. We use Merkle hash trees to verify initial key during
pairwise keys establishment. Specially, any auxiliary nodes
cannot forge bogus initial keys to cheat ordinary nodes, and
the ordinary nodes only accept those initial keys from the real
key groups.
In a Merkle hash tree, the leaf nodes are the hash values
of the authentic objects, and the interior nodes are the
hash values of the concatenation of its two children nodes.
Each of the leaf nodes has its authentication path, referred
to as IDCert, which consists of the sibling nodes of the
nodes on the path from the leaf node to the root of tree
(excluding the root). To verify the authenticity of an object,
one could compute a value using the corresponding IDCert
and compare the computed result with the public root value.
Figure 1 depicts an example of Merkle hash tree where
there are four objects O1, O2, O3, and O4. The values of leaf
nodes are Si = H(Oi) (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), where H is a secure one-
way hash function [24]. The interior node S34 is calculated
as S34 = H(S3‖S4), where “‖” denotes the concatenation
operation.
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When one wishes to verify authenticity of object O1, he
can do so by using the hash value of O1 along with O1’s
authentication path IDCertO1 = {S2, S34}. With these values,
the one who knows the root value S14 can verify the authen-
ticity of O1 by checking if S14 = H(H(H(O1)‖S2)‖S34).
4. The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose the RPKE, a random pairwise
key establishment scheme for WSNs using auxiliary nodes.
RPKE is divided into three phases: (1) predeployment, which
specifies how to preload keying material to each ordinary
node and auxiliary node; (2) derived keys acquisition, which
specifies how to construct the derived key shared between
two neighboring ordinary nodes with help of the common
auxiliary node(s), and (3) pairwise key establishment, which
specifies how to establish a pairwise key using the derived
keys shared between two neighboring ordinary nodes.
4.1. Predployment Phase. During the predeployment phase,
a trusted oﬄine server first generates two key pools, initial
key pool and root key pool; then the auxiliary nodes and the
ordinary nodes are preloaded the key materials, respectively.
4.1.1. Generating Key Pool. The initial key pool consists of
L key groups and each key group consists of M initial keys.
Hence, the initial key pool contains P = L ∗M initial keys,
where L and M are system parameters based on the network
connectivity and security requirements. The jth key in the
ith key group of the initial key pool is denoted as ki, j (i ∈
[1,L], j ∈ [1,M]).
Furthermore, every key group has an identifier, that is,
GIDi is the identifier of the ith key group. Note that the key
group identifier is a private hash value.
Once the initial key pool is generated, the trusted server
constructs LMerkle hash trees, described in Section 3.3. Each
Merkle hash tree corresponds to a key group. The leaves of
Merkle hash tree are generated by hashing initial keys in the
key group (For convenience, assume M is the power of 2).
Hence, there are M leaves in each of Merkle hash tree and L
root values for total Merkle hash trees.
The root key in the root key pool is generated by hashing
concatenation of the root value and its associated group
identifier, that is, Ri = H(ri‖GIDi) (ri is the root value of
the ith Merkle hash tree, where i ∈ [1,L]). Hence, the root
key pool can be denoted as {R1,R2, . . . ,RL}.
4.1.2. Preloading Keying Material. For each ordinary node, it
needs to pick the following secret information:
(1) qn (qn  L ) root keys out of the root key pool
without replacement to establish its key ring,
(2) qn associated with group identifiers, that is, if the root
key Ri is preloaded, the group identifier GIDi must
also be preloaded.
For each auxiliary node, it needs to pick
(1) qa initial keys from the initial key pool without
replacement, where qa  L ∗ M. Note that we do
not have any limitation on the number of initial keys
selected from the same key group. As a result, some
of these keys may come from the same key group,
(2) the associated IDCert of every picked initial key,
(3) a hash image of the root key H(Ri) if there is at least
one initial key of ith key group to be picked. For
example, if the auxiliary node picks the initial key k2,3,
it will also preload H(R2).
After being preloaded with corresponding keying mate-
rial, all nodes, including ordinary nodes and auxiliary nodes,
are randomly deployed in a sensed area.
4.2. Derived Key Acquisition Phase. The derived key acqui-
sition phase occurs after the network deployment. Initially,
each auxiliary node broadcasts a Hello message, announcing
its existence to ordinary nodes within h-hop away. As a
result, all the ordinary nodes know which auxiliary node
is neighbor. Note that the hop count h is a designed
system parameter which determines the number of common
auxiliary nodes for two neighboring ordinary nodes. We will
discuss how the hop count along with network degree and
radio range aﬀects the number of common auxiliary nodes
in Section 5.
When an ordinary nodeU wants to establish pairwise key
with its neighboring ordinary node V , U will send all of its
root key identifiers and its auxiliary node identifiers to V .
V determines that it shares one of the root keys associated
with U , and responds to U a challenge/response. U and V
exchange the messages 1 and 2 as shown in Figure 2:
























The nonce NU is used to defense the replay attack. In this
case, both U and V know that they share t root keys and they
have g common auxiliary nodes.
If U and V share at least one root key, they may generate
derived key(s) with the help of the common auxiliary nodes.
For this, U and V transmit their shared root keys identifiers
to their common auxiliary node(s) as follows:











Once receiving the transmitted messages from U and V ,
the auxiliary node AN will act as a KDC and send one or
more reply packets to U and V . If IDRi is the common key
identifier and AN has preloaded one or more initial keys
from the ith key group, AN will send reply messages to U







Figure 2: Interaction among ordinary nodes U , V , and auxiliary
node AN.
and V . The reply message contains all the preloaded initial
keys of ith key group and their associated IDCerts
5 AN −→ U : IDAN , IDV ,NU , IDRi ,
{




6 AN −→ V : IDAN , IDU ,NV , IDRi ,
{





If there are more than one common root key identifier,
AN may send more than one reply message if it preloads at
least one initial key from the corresponding key groups.
When U receives the reply message from the common
auxiliary nodes AN, it first authenticates the initial keys
using their IDCerts, the associated group identifier, and the
associated root key. If the ki, j has been authenticated, U will
generate a derived key as follow:





V also can generate the similar derived keys in this phase.
4.3. Pairwise Key Establishment Phase. Based on the identi-
fiers knowledge of common neighboring auxiliary nodes and
common root keys, U certainly knows which derived key it
can share with V. Assume that U and V have in common
derived keys {K1,K2, . . . ,Km} with m above the threshold q,
U and V can establish pairwise key as follows:
KUV = K1 ⊕ K2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Km, (5)
where “⊕” denotes the bitwise exclusive OR operation. The
ordinary nodes will erase the derived keys when the pairwise
key has been generated.
Two neighboring ordinary nodes U and V may not share
root keys due to the randomness in root keys predistribution.
If so, they cannot directly establish pairwise key with help of
their common auxiliary nodes. In such case, we adopt the
approach similar to that given in [17] to establish pairwise
key for U and V. That is, assume there is a key path
{U ,V1,V2, . . . ,Vj ,V} in which each pair of ordinary nodes,
(U ,V1), (V1,V2), . . . , (Vj ,V), has established the secure link.
U first generates a random key K and sends the key to V1
using their secure link, V1 sends the key to V2 using the
secure link between V1 and V2, and so on until V receives the
key fromVj , U andV will use the keyK as their pairwise key.
The length of key path is the number of intermediate nodes,
that is, {V1,V2, . . . ,Vj}.
5. Performance Evaluations
In the following section, we discuss the performance metric
for the proposed RPKE scheme and compare it with other
classical random key predistribution schemes [7, 11].
5.1. Network Connectivity. Since the ordinary nodes are
in charge of normal network operations, the “network
connectivity probability” is defined as the probability of
establishing secure communication link between two neigh-
boring ordinary nodes. As shown in (5), if two neighboring
ordinary nodes share enough number of derived keys,
they can establish pairwise key, that is, establish a secure
communication link.
Two neighboring ordinary nodes U and V must share
derived keys if the following conditions hold:
(1) U and V share at least one root key;
(2) at least one of their common auxiliary nodes picks
one or more initial keys from the key groups whose
root keys are shared by U and V .
Now we discuss how to satisfy the two above-mentioned
conditions in order to establish pairwise key between two
neighboring ordinary nodes.
Let mi be the number of common derived keys between
U and V through the common auxiliary node ANi. The
total number of common derived keys m between U and V
through all their g common auxiliary nodes thus ism = m1 +
m2 + · · · +mg . Then we can give the following conclusions.
Lemma 1. Assuming that two neighboring ordinary nodes U
and V have only a common auxiliary node, if U shares exactly
i root keys with V, the common derived keys shared between
them must be no more than i∗M.
Proof. Each root key can authenticate at most M initial keys,
since the common derived keys must come from key groups
which root keys are shared between U and V, if U and V
share i root keys and the common auxiliary node picks all the
i ∗M initial keys of the total i key groups, these keys will be
authenticated byU andV, then they will share i∗M common
derived keys. Otherwise, if any one of the initial keys among
these i∗M keys is not picked by the common auxiliary node,
the common derived keys shared between U and V must be
no more than i∗M.
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Theorem 2. Assume that neighboring ordinary nodes U and
V have g common auxiliary nodes, and the number of
common derived keys shared between U and V through each
of g common auxiliary nodes is m1,m2, . . . ,mg , respectively
(for all i,mi  qn); then the number of root keys shared
between U and V must be at least 
max(m1,m2, . . . ,mg)/M.
Proof. If U and V share i root keys, according to Lemma 1,
the common derived keys shared between them must
range from 0 to i ∗ M. If they can generate mi common
derived keys through the common auxiliary node ANi,
they must share at least 
mi/M root keys. For all the
mi (i = 1, 2, . . . , g), if U and V share enough number
of root keys to ensure generating the maximum com-
mon derived keys amongst m1,m2, . . . ,mg through one of
common auxiliary nodes, they are able to generate other
common derived keys through other common auxiliary
nodes. Therefore, the number of shared root keys must be
at least 
max(m1,m2, . . . ,mg)/M.
Assume that U shares i root keys with V and there is only
one common auxiliary node between U and V. Obviously, U
and V can generate at most i ∗ M common derived keys.






ways to let the common auxiliary node select






ways to let the common auxiliary node
randomly select (qa − m) diﬀerent initial keys from the
remaining (L − i) key groups. Hence, the total number of
ways that the common auxiliary node selects initial keys from










When two neighboring ordinary nodes U and V have g
common auxiliary nodes, the total number of ways that U
and V share m derived keys can be calculated as follows:





diﬀerent ways to randomly
select qn root keys from root key pool.
Second, the shared derived keys, that is, m1,m2, . . . ,mg
between U and V, must range from 0 to m and m =
m1 + m2 + · · · + mg . Hence there are
∑
m1+m2+···+mg=m
ways to let every common auxiliary node provide shared
initial keys. According to Theorem 2, U must share at
least 
max(m1,m2, . . . ,mg)/M root keys with V. Once
m1,m2, . . . ,mg are fixed, the number of shared root
keys will range from 
max(m1,m2, . . .mg)/M to qn.
Hence, the total number of ways by which V randomly











. The total number of ways
that g common auxiliary nodes randomly select initial keys
is Ω(i,m1)Ω(i,m2) · · ·Ω(i,mg), where Ω(i,mj) for j =
1, 2, . . . , g is defined in (6).
Hence, the probability that two neighboring ordinary
nodes share m (m  0) derived keys when they have g

























Let pconnect be the probability of two neighboring
ordinary nodes sharing suﬃcient derived keys to establish
pairwise key. Obviously, pconnect = 1 − Prob. {two
neighboring ordinary nodes share insuﬃcient derived keys
to establish pairwise key}. Hence, we have
pconnect = 1−
(






























From (8), we can conclude that the system parameters,
such as, the number of common auxiliary nodes, the size of
the initial key group, the number of initial key groups, and
may influence the network connectivity performance.
5.2. Impact of the System Parameters. One of design goals
for the RPKE is to achieve high network connectivity while
ordinary nodes only need to preload a few keying materials.
In this subsection, we determine the number of required root
keys to achieve targeted network connectivity using the above
equations. We discuss these system parameters through both
theoretical analysis and simulation studies. Note that the
following analysis is required to achieve 99.99% network
connectivity probability.
5.2.1. Number of Common Auxiliary Nodes. The number
of derived keys for ordinary nodes relies on the number
of their neighboring auxiliary nodes. Hence, the larger the
number of common auxiliary nodes for the two neighboring
ordinary nodes, the higher the probability that they share
common derived keys. Figure 3 shows the number of root
keys required in every ordinary node versus the number of
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Figure 3: The number of preloaded root keys versus the number
of preloaded initial keys varying with the number of common
auxiliary nodes.






























The number of preloaded root keys
Figure 4: The number of preloaded initial keys versus the number
of preloaded root keys varying with diﬀerent size of key group.
initial keys preloaded in auxiliary nodes varying with the
number of common auxiliary nodes.
This chart oﬀers the results as expected in the aforesaid
observation, that is, the storage overhead in ordinary nodes
reduces with the increase of the number of common auxiliary
nodes. In addition, it also shows an interesting phenomenon,
that is, increasing the number of common auxiliary nodes
does not result in a remarkable decrease of the number
of preloaded root keys when the auxiliary node preloads
enough number of initial keys. For example, when an
auxiliary node preloads 3000 initial keys and the number of
common auxiliary nodes increases from 2 to 3, the number of
root keys required in ordinary node decreases by only 3.29%
(from 152 to 147).
5.2.2. The Size of Key Group. Each initial key in the same key
group can be verified by the root key. Hence, the larger the
size of a key group, the more initial keys can the ordinary
nodes verify. That is, the ordinary nodes require storing fewer
root keys. Figure 4 shows how the size of key group influences
the number of root keys stored in an ordinary node when
diﬀerent initial keys are preloaded in the auxiliary nodes.
It is worthy to point out that the curve will be smoother
when the size of the key group increases, which means that
the root keys decrease slowly. For example, when the number
of preloaded initial keys increases from 1000 to 3000, the
number of preloaded root keys will decrease 32.8% (from
368 to 247) whenM = 4, and 13.8% (from 116 to 100) when
M = 16. Hence, if the size of the key group is large enough,
increasing the number of initial keys preloaded in auxiliary
node cannot remarkably impact the network connectivity. It
shows that the size of the key group is a critical factor that
determines the number of preloaded root keys.
5.3. Comparison with Other Existing Schemes
5.3.1. Comparison with Basic Scheme. In the basic scheme
[7], a sensor node must preload more keys with increased
size of key pool to achieve desired network connectivity
performance. Due to resource constraints in sensor nodes,
the size of the key pool cannot be too large. On the other
hand, a larger key pool size is desirable to prevent the
adversary to capture more sensor nodes by exposing the key
pool.
Figure 5 compares the storage overhead of the basic
scheme and RPKE varying with the size of the key pool.
It shows that not only does the number of root keys
preloaded in ordinary node is smaller than the number of
keys preloaded in node in the basic scheme, but also the
number of preloaded root keys will hardly increase in the
RPKE, no matter how the size of the key pool is selected if
the number of key groups is fixed. Compared with the basic
scheme, a significant characteristic in RPKE is that it can
properly tune to the size of the key group so as to keep the
almost same number of root keys required to store in the
ordinary node no matter how large the size of the key pool
is. It also proves that RPKE would be more eﬃcient when the
size of the key pool is relatively large and it is more suitable
for large-scale networks.
5.3.2. Comparison with q-composite Scheme. The q-
composite scheme improves the resilience against node
compromise by increasing the threshold of common keys,
thus more keys are preloaded in sensor or the size of key
pool must be reduced.
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Table 1: The setting of parameters in the simulation.
Parameters Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Total Number of Sensor Nodes 1000 500
Field 1000m× 1000m
Transmission Range of Ordinary Nodes 40m
Transmission Range of Auxiliary Nodes 40m, 60m, 80m
The Proportion of Auxiliary Nodes 10%, 15%































qa = 2000, g = 2
RPKE (L = 5000)
RPKE (L = 2500)
RPKE (L = 1250)
Figure 5: RPKE versus the Basic Scheme.
Figure 6 compares q-composite scheme with RPKE with
the size of key group. It can be seen that the total number
of preloaded root keys in RPKE is smaller than that in
the q-composite scheme. Moreover, when the size of key
groups increases slightly, the number of preloaded root keys
in ordinary nodes can reduce remarkably. Hence, RPKE
increases only fewer root keys to achieve higher key match
if the size of the key group is large enough.
5.4. Simulations
5.4.1. Hop Count. As aforesaid, the number of common
auxiliary nodes between two neighboring ordinary nodes
will aﬀect the hop count h greatly. We set up two scenarios in
which the main parameters used in simulation are shown in
Table 1. Obviously, based on the above setting, the network
degrees of two scenarios are 12 and 8, respectively. In the
experiments, all the sensor nodes are uniformly distributed
in the field, and each simulation result is averaged over 1,000
times.
Figures 7(a)–7(d) show the simulation results, where
“Degree” is network degree and “Ratio” is the proportion
of auxiliary nodes to the total nodes. “R” and “r” are the
transmission ranges of auxiliary nodes and ordinary nodes,

































RPKE (M = 4)
RPKE (M = 8)
RPKE (M = 16)
Figure 6: RPKE versus The q-composite Scheme.
respectively. It can be easily observed that the larger the
hop count or the higher network degree is, the more the
number of common auxiliary nodes. Similarly, increasing the
transmission of auxiliary nodes can also eﬀectively increase
the number of common auxiliary nodes. Hence, we have
several diﬀerent strategies to obtain a certain number of
common auxiliary nodes according to the application.
5.4.2. Verification of Theoretical Result. To verify the the-
oretical results in (8), we design five scenarios in which
diﬀerent parameters are given under the 99.99% network
connectivity probability. We consider a network of 100 nodes
in which each node can reach to another node within 1-hop;
moreover, any two neighboring ordinary nodes can obtain
initial keys from the required number of common auxiliary
nodes. The simulation results are shown in Figure 8.
In all five scenarios, the average simulation values are
within 1.89% of those calculated with (8).
5.5. Overload Analysis. We will analyze the overheads for the
RPKE in term of storage, communication, and computation
cost, respectively. The auxiliary nodes are ignored since they
do not participate in normal network operation.




























































































(d) Degree = 12, Ratio = 15%
Figure 7: Hop count versus the number of common auxiliary nodes between two neighboring ordinary nodes varying with transmission
range of auxiliary nodes, network degree, and the proportion of auxiliary nodes.
5.5.1. Storage Overload. The storage overhead of RPKE con-
sists of the number of root keys and the key group identifiers
held by an ordinary node. Clearly, as the aforesaid analysis
in Section 5.1, to achieve the same network connectivity
probability, RPKE requires fewer preloaded keying materials
than other similar schemes. As shown in Figure 5, to achieve
99.99% network connectivity probability, ordinary node
only needs to preload about 100 keys while the number of
preloaded keys in basic scheme is about 1200 when the key
pool is set to 16∗104 and the corresponding size of key group
is 128. Even in such case, the storage requirement of RPKE is
200 keys if the key group identifier has the same length as the
root key.
5.5.2. Communication Overload. According to the above
discussions in Section 4.3, if two neighboring nodes do not
share any root keys, they need to find a key path to establish
their pairwise key. Now we analyze the required number
of hops to establish a pairwise key and the communication
overhead distributed on each hop through simulations. The
network connectivity probability and the communication
overhead weight varying with diﬀerent network degree and
the length path are shown in Figure 9.
The simulation results show that communication over-
head of pairwise key establishment in the dense network
is mainly distributed within first three hops. The smaller
the maximum number of hops, the less the communication
10 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking

























M = 8, L = 2500, g = 1
M = 8, L = 2500, g = 2
M = 8, L = 2500, g = 3
M = 4, L = 5000, g = 2
M = 16, L = 1250, g = 2
Figure 8: Simulation results under diﬀerent system parameters.
overhead involved if the network connectivity probability is
given.
5.5.3. Computation Overload. The computational overhead
of an arbitrary ordinary node consists of two parts: initial
keys authentication and pairwise key establishment. Ordinary
node must authenticate each initial key sent from the
common auxiliary nodes. To verify an initial key taking
(log2M + 2) hash operations (M is the size of key group),
it will take one hash operation to generate a derived key
from each authenticated initial key. Since each pairwise key is
constructed bym derived keys, hence, an ordinary node takes
m ∗ (log2M + 3) hash operations to generate a pairwise key.
Assume the network degree is d, the computational overhead
for an arbitrary ordinary node is d ∗m ∗ (log2M + 2) hash
operations.
Note that the computational overhead of iPAK [20], LKE
[21], and SBK [22] is O(λ) (λ is a security parameter which
has the property that as long as no more than λ nodes are
compromised, all communication links of noncompromised
nodes remain secure) modular multiplications. Each mod-
ular multiplication takes 810ms on the Atmega 128 L 8M
processor [25], while a RC5 hash operation takes only 5.6ms
[26]. Thus, RPKE is more scalable than iPAK, LKE, or SBK.
Diﬀerent from the unbalanced random key predistribu-
tion scheme [18] as described in Section 2, in which L2 nodes
must establish secure connections with the L1 nodes, in
RPKE, the auxiliary nodes need not establish the pairwise key
with the ordinary nodes or other auxiliary nodes. The ordi-
nary nodes have less storage/computation/communication
overload than L2 or L1 nodes.
5.6. Summary. The above theoretical and simulation anal-
ysis shows that RPKE significantly outperforms previous
counterparts in terms of network connectivity, resilience
against node compromise, and communication overheads.
Such improvement is attributed to the role of auxiliary
nodes and the property of key groups using Merkle hash
tree, which eﬃciently enhance the correlation of initial keys
preloaded in the auxiliary nodes and thus increase the chance
for ordinary nodes to generate derived keys. Moreover, to
achieve excellent network connectivity and high security
strength, RPKE scheme can conveniently tune: (1) the size
of key group, (2) the number of common auxiliary nodes,
and (3) the total number of key groups.
6. Security Analysis
The security of pairwise key in RPKE relies on both the
associated initial keys and root keys.
Theorem 3. For two neighboring ordinary nodes U and V, if at
least one of root key, or initial key, used to generate derived keys
is secure, the pairwise key between them must be secure.
Proof. According to (4), the derived key Ki, j would be secure
if the initial key ki, j or the root key Ri is secure (assume
the identifiers of auxiliary nodes are public). It can also be
concluded from (5) that the pairwise key will be secure if only
at least one of its derived keys is secure.
In the subsection, we discuss how the ordinary nodes or
auxiliary nodes compromise impacts the network security.
6.1. Sensor Nodes Compromise. From the system’s perspec-
tive, the adversary can capture any number of auxiliary nodes
or ordinary nodes arbitrarily. So they have higher probability
of compromising a fraction of auxiliary nodes and ordinary
nodes in a special region. Now we discuss how the sensor
nodes compromise aﬀects the secure communication link
between two noncompromised ordinary nodes, that is, the
probability of pairwise key between two noncompromised
ordinary nodes being compromised when there are a fraction
of compromised sensor nodes.
We assume there are x compromised sensor nodes, in
which the proportion of compromised auxiliary nodes is
fc. Hence, there are x fc compromised auxiliary nodes and
x(1− fc) compromised ordinary nodes.
If an auxiliary node is compromised, the adversary can
acquire all its qa preloaded initial keys. Hence, the probability
of an initial key not preloaded by a compromised auxiliary
node is 1 − qa/(L × M), when there are x fc compromised
auxiliary nodes, the probability of an initial key still being
secure is (1− qa/(L×M))x fc . Similarly, if an ordinary node is
compromised, the adversary can acquire all its qn preloaded
root keys. Hence, the probability of a root key being not
preloaded by a compromised ordinary node is 1 − qn/L,
when there are x(1 − fc) compromised ordinary nodes, the
probability of a root key still being secure is (1− qn/L)x(1− fc).
According to Theorem 3, if an initial key or a root
key is secure, the derived key generated by them must be
secure, in other words, the derived key is compromised if
both the associated initial key and root key are insecure.
Therefore, when there are x fc compromised auxiliary nodes
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 11










M = 32, L = 11462, qa = 3000, qn = 200, g = 2, q = 2
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Figure 9: Communication overhead for diﬀerent network degrees.
and x(1− fc) compromised ordinary nodes, the probability of
a derived key being compromised is (1−(1− qn/L)x(1− fc))(1−
(1− qa/(L×M))x fc).
If the communication link key between two neighboring
ordinary nodes is computed from m common derived keys,
the probability of a communication link being compromised
is((1− (1− qn/L)x(1− fc))(1− (1− qa/(L×M))x fc))
m
. Hence,
the probability pc that the communication links between two
noncompromised neighboring ordinary nodes are compro-
mised when there are x fc compromised auxiliary nodes and




















Here, p(m) and pconnect are defined as in (7) and (8),
respectively, and g is the average number of common
auxiliary nodes between two neighboring ordinary nodes.
Figure 10 shows the resilience property of RPKE in the
case of diﬀerent network configuration. It is clear that pc
will increases with fc for all scenarios. It will improve the
resilience against node compromise with the increase of
number of preloaded initial keys, or the size of key group,
or the number of common auxiliary nodes.
The adversary may launch selective attacks, that is, he
may select the auxiliary nodes to compromise if he can
identify which node is auxiliary one. As a result, if the
adversary can compromise all the auxiliary nodes during
the pairwise keys establishment, the ordinary nodes may
not establish pairwise keys with the help of their common
auxiliary nodes. In practice, due to the similar appearance of
the auxiliary nodes and ordinary nodes, there is no easy way
to diﬀerentiate between them after the network deployment.
The adversary would then randomly select an arbitrary
number of auxiliary nodes or ordinary nodes to compromise.
Hence, the value of fc can be controlled within low bound.
6.2. Comparison with Other Existing Schemes. We will com-
pare the RPKE with the existing random key establishment
schemes. Figure 11 shows the resilience property of the basic
scheme [7], q-composite scheme [11], and the proposed
RPKE.
Obviously, RPKE provides greater resilience against node
compromise than the basic scheme or q-composite scheme.
For example, when there are 250 compromised sensor nodes,
the fraction of compromised communication links is 44.75%
in the basic scheme and 48.27% in the q-composite scheme;
whereas RPKE is only 5.73% (for fc = 10%), 19.09% (for
fc = 20%), or 35.05% (for fc = 30%). Moreover, as shown
in above analysis, we can tune some of the system parameters,
such as the size of key group, the number of key group, or the
number of auxiliary nodes, to improve the security strength
in RPKE.
6.3. Other Attacks. The adversary may eavesdrop on all
traﬃc or reply older packets. RPKE can defense such passive
attacks eﬃciently. On one hand, since every packet sent by
auxiliary nodes is encrypted by the hash image of root key,
the adversary cannot obtain any secret information from
such packet if it does not obtain the associated root key.
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(a) qa = 3000, qn = 200, M = 32, q = 2, g = 2



























(b) qa = 3000, qn = 200, M = 32, q = 2, g = 1



























(c) qa = 2000, qn = 200, M = 16, q = 2, g = 1
Figure 10: Resilience against sensor nodes compromise, where pconnect = 0.5.
On the other hand, every packet broadcasted amongst
ordinary nodes only includes the indices information; the
adversary cannot acquire any secret information about the
derived keys even though they can acquire these indices.
According to the description in Section 4.2, adding the nonce
in each packet can defense the reply attack.
The adversary may impersonate the common auxiliary
nodes or use the compromised auxiliary nodes to fabricate
initial keys. Such fake messages, however, cannot cause the
ordinary nodes to accept the wrong initial keys because each
ordinary node uses Merkle hash tree-based authentication
method to verify the correctness of each received initial
key.
The compromised ordinary nodes may send more
request messages to other auxiliary nodes so as to compro-
mise more initial keys. Some eﬃcient mechanisms can be
designed to defense such attack. For example, the distributed
KDC is only in charge of disseminating initial keys to
its neighboring ordinary nodes and replies those request
messages which are consistent with what its two neighboring
ordinary nodes claim. In other words, if two neighboring
ordinary nodes claim diﬀerent root key identifiers for the
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 13
























qa = 2000, qn = 300,M = 16, g = 1
Basic scheme
q-composite scheme
RPKE ( fc = 10%)
RPKE ( fc = 20%)
RPKE ( fc = 30%)
Figure 11: The fraction of compromised communication link
between two noncompromised ordinary nodes in diﬀerent schemes,
where pconnect = 0.5.
same auxiliary node, the auxiliary node will refuse to reply
such request messages.
Moreover, since the role of auxiliary nodes is to act as
distributed KDC to help ordinary nodes establish pairwise
keys, once pairwise key establishment procedure is finished,
we can remove all the auxiliary nodes from the networks if
we only consider static networks or there is no node addition
during network operation.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a random pairwise key
establishment scheme (RPKE) for WSNs. RPKE aims at
achieving good performance in terms of network connec-
tivity probability and strong security strength at the cost of
low overheads for ordinary nodes. Theoretical and simulative
evaluations demonstrate that it is an eﬀective approach
to use some additional nodes as distributed KDCs during
the pairwise key establishment. RPKE not only reduces the
storage requirement in ordinary nodes but also resist node
compromise. Moreover, the system parameters in RPKE
can be conveniently tuned to achieve excellent network
connectivity and high security strength according to the
applications.
Acknowledgments
This work is supported by the Natural Science Foundation
of China (nos. 60932003, 61071065, and 60970101) and
the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Program of
China (nos. 2010CB328105 and 2009CB320504).
References
[1] J. Kahn, R. Katz, and K. Pister, “Next century challenges:
mobile networking for smart dust,” in Proceedings of the
5th Annual ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile
Computing and Networking (MOBICOM ’99), Seattle, Wash,
USA, 1999.
[2] I. F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci,
“Wireless sensor networks: a survey,” Computer Networks, vol.
38, no. 4, pp. 393–422, 2002.
[3] J. Chen, S. He, Y. Sun, P. Thulasiramanz, and X. Shen,
“Optimal flow control for utility-lifetime tradeoﬀ in wireless
sensor networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 53, no. 18, pp.
3031–3041, 2009.
[4] Crossbow Technology, “MICA2: Wireless measurement sys-
tem,” https://www.eol.ucar.edu/rtf/facilities/isa/internal/Cro-
ssBow/DataSheets/mica2.pdf.
[5] K. C. Koc, “High-speed RSA implementation,” Tech. Rep.,
RSA Laboratories, 1994.
[6] B. C. Neuman and T. Tso, “Kerberos. An authentication service
for computer networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol.
32, no. 9, pp. 33–38, 1994.
[7] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme
for distributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS
’02), pp. 41–47, November 2002.
[8] Y. Jiang, C. Lin, M. Shi, and X. Shen, “Seal-healing group
key distribution with time-limited user revocation for wireless
sensor networks,” Ad Hoc Networks, Elsevier, vol. 5, no. 1, pp.
14–23, 2007.
[9] Y. Jiang, C. Lin, X. Shen, and M. Shi, “A DoS and fault tolerant
authentication protocol for group communications in Ad Hoc
networks,” Computer Communications, Elsevier, vol. 30, no. 1,
pp. 2428–2441, 2007.
[10] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, J. D. Tygar, V. Wen, and D. E. Culler,
“SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks,” Wireless
Networks, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 521–534, 2002.
[11] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key predistribution
schemes for sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security And Privacy, pp. 197–213, May 2003.
[12] S. Blackshear and R. M. Verma, “R-LEAP+: randomizing
LEAP+ key distribution to resist replay and jamming attacks,”
in Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing,
pp. 1985–1992, 2010.
[13] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Establishing pairwise keys in distributed
sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’03), pp. 52–
61, October 2003.
[14] W. Du, Y. S. Han, J. Deng, and P. K. Varshney, “A pair-wise
key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks,”
in Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS ’03), pp. 42–51, October 2003.
[15] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Location-based pair-wise key establish-
ments for static sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 1st
ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor networks, pp.
72–82, October 2003.
[16] D. Huang, M. Mehta, D. Medhi, and L. Harn, “Location-
aware key management scheme for wireless sensor networks,”
in Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and
Sensor Networks (SASN ’04), pp. 29–42, October 2004.
[17] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, S. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, “A
key management scheme for wireless sensor networks using
deployment knowledge,” in Proceedings of the 23rd Annual
14 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications
Societies (INFOCOM ’04), pp. 586–597, Hong Kong, March
2004.
[18] P. Traynor, H. Choi, G. Cao, S. Zhu, and T. La Porta, “Estab-
lishing pair-wise keys in heterogeneous sensor networks,” in
Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the IEEE Computer
and Communications Societies (INFOCOM ’06), Barcelona,
Spain, April 2006.
[19] T. Vu, R. Safavi-Naini, and C. Williamson, “Securing wireless
sensor networks against large-scale node capture attacks,”
in Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS ’10), pp.
112–123, Beijing, China, April 2010.
[20] L. Ma, X. Cheng, F. Liu, F. An, and J. Rivera, “iPAK: an in-
situ pair-wise key bootstrapping scheme for wireless sensor
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 1174–1184, 2007.
[21] F. Liu and X. Cheng, “LKE: a self-configuring scheme for
location-aware key establishment in wireless sensor networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 7, no. 1,
pp. 224–232, 2008.
[22] F. Liu, X. Cheng, L. Ma, and K. Xing, “SBK: a self-configuring
framework for bootstrapping keys in sensor networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 7, no. 7, pp. 858–868,
2008.
[23] R. C. Merkle, “Protocols for public key cryptosystems,” in
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and
Privacy, p. 122, 1980.
[24] R. Rivest, “The RC5 encryption algorithm,” in Proceedings of
the 1st InternationalWorkshop on Fast Software Encryption, vol.
809, pp. 86–96, Leuven Belgium, December 1994.
[25] A. S. Wandert, N. Gura, H. Eberle, V. Gupta, and S. C. Shantz,
“Energy analysis of public-key cryptography for wireless
sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
(PerCom ’05) 2005, pp. 324–328, March 2005.
[26] P. Ganesan, R. Venugopalan, P. Peddabachagari, A. Dean, F.
Mueller, andM. Sichitiu, “Analyzing andmodeling encryption
overhead for sensor network nodes,” in Proceedings of the 2nd
ACM International Workshop on Wireless Sensor Networks and
Applications (WSNA ’03), pp. 151–159, September 2003.
